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without proper service and representation. The German commentators (loc. cit.) rightly observe that it is doubtful whether German
public policy should have been invoked here since the husband was an
American citizen domiciled in New Jersey and the wife had lost her
German nationality by her marriage. The decree would not have been
recognized in New Jersey, however, if properly attacked, and could be
disregarded for this reason in Germany.
Summing up, therefore, it can be said' that there might be instances where the German courts would recognize a Mexican decree
but mail order decrees will not be admitted and one-day residence
decrees will most probably be considered equally void in the eyes of
German justice.

ITALY
RICCARDO GORI-MONTANELLI AND DAVID A.

BOTWINIK

*

The subject, "Enforcement of Foreign Divorce Decrees in Italy,"
can only be considered in light of that country's Catholicism. Since
the unification of Italy, civil authorities have accepted and incorporated
into law the Catholic religious tradition that marriage is an institution
of vital importance to society, dissoluble only by death (Art. 149,
Italian Civil Code). In 1929, the principle embodied in Art. 149 was
further formalized in the Concordat between Italy and the Holy See.1
Art. 34 of the Concordat provides that:
The Italian State wishing to again give the institution of marriage, which
is the basis of the family relationship, a dignity consistent with the Catholic
traditions of its people, recognizes all civil effects of the sacrament of
matrimony as regulated by common law.
The Concordat therefore permits marriages performed by a priest
of the Catholic Church according to the canon law to be recorded in
* Mr. Gori-Montanelli is an Italian resident partner and Mr. Botwinik is a
New York partner of Fink & Pavia, a firm dealing extensively in Italian matters.

Mr. Gori-Montanelli, who was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar in
1957, maintains an active interest and participation in American as well as

Italian legal matters. Mr. Botwinik received his L.L.B. from the Yale Law
School in 1954 and was admitted to the New York Bar in the same year.
' Signed February 11, 1929 and ratified by Law No. 810 on May 7, 1929.
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the Italian Vital Statistics Registry and gives them the same validity
as if they had been performed before the Italian civil authorities.
As a consequence of the public policy expressed in Art. 149 and
in the Concordat, Italian courts do not have the power to grant a
divorce.
While they do have the power to recognize and give effect to a
foreign judgment of divorce, they exercise the power with due regard
to Italian public policy, and recognize foreign divorce decrees only in
limited circumstances.
A foreign judgment of divorce is given effect in Italy in the
same manner as any other judgment. It must be rendered executory
by the delibazione proceeding covered by Art. 797 of the Civil Procedure Code.'
The Italian Government subscribes to the theory in Trammel v.
Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214, "that there are in effect three parties to every
marriage, the man, the woman, and the state." I In every delibazione
proceeding involving a matrimonial judgment, the State Attorney
appears in the role of protector of the marriage. He is given all the
powers which private parties have,' and has the right to appeal.'
The power to appeal by the State Attorney was very limited until
1950 when the Civil Procedure Code was amended to permit an
appeal by the State Attorney not only to the court where the decision
was rendered, but also to the Supreme Court of Cassation. The
amendment also gives the State Attorney of the Court of Cassation
the right to take an appeal if the local State Attorney decides not to.
The 1950 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure was avowedly
aimed at halting the liberal trend shown by certain courts of appeal in
enforcing foreign divorce decrees. With the justification of national
uniformity in interpretation of the law, the Italian Government thereby
eliminated the possibility that the liberal views expressed by certain
2 See

Gori-Montanelli and Botwinik, "Enforcement in Italy of Judgments
Obtained under 'Long Arm' and 'Single Act' Statutes," 1964 Proceedings of the
Section of InternationalCommercial Law, American Bar Association, p. 227.
Quoted with approval by Judge Scileppi in his dissenting opinion in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 NY 2d 64.
4 Art. 72, Code of Civil Procedure.
5 Inasmuch as applications for enforcement of foreign judgments are submitted to the competent court of appeal, the next appeal is to the Supreme Court
of Cassation.
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local judges or State Attorneys would loosen the national anti-divorce
policy.6
The practical effect of the State Attorney's appearance in proceedings to enforce foreign divorce decrees has been to prevent their
enforcement insofar as Italian citizens are concerned. Foreigners are
treated differently.
Italy has ratified the Hague Convention on Divorce of June 12,
1902.' Italy has also entered into a number of bilateral treaties with
several countries containing clauses providing for the reciprocal recognition of judgments. Under Article 7 of the Convention, the member
states obligate themselves to recognize a divorce or separation decreed
by a competent court, provided the provisions of the Convention have
been observed. Italian courts held that by ratifying the Hague Convention, the Italian State agreed to limit the principle of indissolubility
of marriage to Italy and permit the recognition of foreign divorce
decrees granted by courts of proper jurisdiction when divorce is permitted by the personal law of the spouses.
With this general background, we can now consider in depth the
manner in which the Italian courts treat proceedings for enforcement
of foreign matrimonial decrees. Whether the decree is one of annulment or divorce, there is a basic distinction between the treatment of
Catholic and civil marriages.
Annulment
Canonical Marriages
In ratifying the Concordat with the Holy See in 1929, Italy,
besides reiterating its acceptance of the principle of the indissolubility
of marriage, whether canonical or civil, as a basic tenet of its legal
system, gave full civil recognition to a marriage ceremony performed
by a priest of the Catholic Church.' The parish priest, before performing the marriage, must carry out certain formalities, required by the
Italian law, such as the publication of the marriage notice in the local
City Hall for a specified number of days, and the reading of the text
6 Mario Miele, Scritti di Diritto Matrimoniale, Padova, 1964, pp. 178, 183

and 289; Montel, "Italy: Recognition of Foreign Annulment and Divorce
Decrees," 4 Am. J. Comp. Law (1955) 439-443.
7Law 527 of July 7, 1905.
8 Law No. 847 of May 27, 1929 "Provisions for the Implementation of the
Concordat of February 11, 1929 between the Holy See and Italy for the part
concerning marriage."
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of three articles of the Italian Civil Code on the rights and duties
resulting from the marriage. Once the marriage is performed, the
parish priest notifies the competent civil authorities so that the marriage
can be registered in the Vital Statistics Registry. This type of marriage
is known as matrimonio concordatario,that is, marriage according to
the Concordat, and is by far the most common type of marriage in a
country where about 99 percent of the population is registered as
Catholic.
Non-Catholics who wish to be married before a minister of their
own religion, and their religion being one recognized and accepted by
the Italian Government, may do so provided they obtain a written
authorization from the civil authority otherwise competent to perform
the ceremony. Provided the requirements set by Italian Law are met,9
such marriages are recorded in the Italian Vital Statistics Registry
and have full civil law validity.
The other type of marriage is the one performed by the competent
Italian Civil authority and is known as the civil marriage.
The importance of the Concordat, as far as the recognition of
matrimonial judgments is concerned, lies in Art. 34, the fourth paragraph of which states:
Litigation involving the annulment of a marriage and the dispensation from
a marriage "ratio et non consumato" (performed but not consummated)
are reserved to the jurisdiction of ecclesiastic courts and institutions.
This reservation of exclusive jurisdiction to the ecclesiastical
courts in all cases involving the annulment of a marriage concordatario
deprives all civil judicial authorities whether Italian or foreign of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Italian courts, requested to give recognition and effect in Italy to a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
performed in Italy in accordance with the provisions of the Concordat, have constantly refused to do so because the foreign judgment
lacks a basic condition for recognition set forth in Article 797(1)
C.p.C., i.e., that the Court granting judgment must have had jurisdiction according to the concepts of the forum where recognition is
sought. According to the concepts of the Italian forum, only ecclesiastical courts have jurisdiction over the matter."
9 Law No. 1159 of June 29, 1929, "Provisions regarding the exercise of
religious activities by religions admitted in the State and marriages performed
by ministers of said religions."
10 Court of Cassation, Decision of January 30, 1961, No. 171, Gonelli v.

De Blosis, 1961 Settimana della Cassazione 236.
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Courts have interpreted Article 34 of the Concordat to exclude
the jurisdiction of foreign civil courts not only when the marriage was
performed in Italy before a priest of the Catholic Church, and thereafter recorded in the Italian Vital Statistics Registry, but also when the
marriage was performed abroad by a Catholic priest and was valid for
all civil effects according to the law of the country of performance. If
such a marriage had been annulled by an ecclesiastic court abroad
having jurisdiction according to the canon law, then the annulment
decree would be recognized in Italy and given exequatur by a civil
court.11
While Italian courts do not give any suggestion of abandoning the
line of precedents which prevents recognition of foreign annulment
decrees of Catholic marriages, there are Italian writers who have
criticized the judicial interpretation given to Article 34 of the Concordat. - They are of the opinion that Article 34 never was intended
to insert in the Italian legal system a rule which denies the jurisdiction
of foreign judges in cases involving the annulment of religious marriages. Since Article 34 does not explicitly state that Italy recognizes the
exclusive jurisdiction of ecclesiastic courts in its relationship with other
foreign jurisdictons, the exclusivity thereof applies only to the relationship between Italy and the other contracting party of the Concordat: the Holy See. One of the general principles of international law
in the interpretation of Treaties (and the Concordat is an international
treaty) is that they should be interpreted literally, without limitation or
extension."3 If there is any doubt as to the real meaning of the wording, in choosing between several admissible interpretations, the one
which involves the minimum of obligations for the parties should be
adopted. 4 By applying these rules to Article 34 of the Concordat, one
should conclude that there is no explicit restriction on the right of
Italian courts to recognize the jurisdiction of foreign courts to annul
canonical marriages."11Court of Appeal of Rome, July 14, 1960, NcC. i.e., 1960 Archivio Ricerche
Giuridiche, III, 19 (m).
12 Mario Miele, pp. 134-140.
13 Publication of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B,
No. 11, p. 39.
14 Publications of the P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 12, p. 25.
15 In Scritti di Diritto Matrimoniale, p. 139, Prof. Miele notes that "the
excessive interpretation of Art. 34 and of the Italian enabling legislation has its
basis in the particular political environment which prevailed in Italy immediately
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 2
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Civil Marriages
Marriages performed in accordance with the Italian Civil Code
by the proper authority are outside the purview of the Concordat and
there is no limitation in the jurisdiction of Civil Courts on the subject
of their annulment. The question of the recognition of foreign annulment decrees is therefore regulated by the general rules set forth in
Article 797 C.P.C. It does not make any difference whether the parties
involved are Italian or foreign. If they are Italian, the important consideration will be that of determining whether the foreign court had
jurisdiction over them.
In a decision rendered in 1962 involving the recognition of a
United States decree annulling a civil marriage, the Supreme Court of
Cassation denied recognition on the ground that the parties were
Italians and the only connection with the jurisdiction of the foreign
judge was its acceptance by the defendant husband. The court stated
that if the defendant, an Italian citizen, had been domiciled or resident
in the foreign jurisdiction, the foreign judge would have had jurisdiction in accordance with the Italian concepts. 6 In the particular case,
the defendant had accepted the foreign jurisdiction by voluntary appearance through an authorized attorney, and the court, while recognizing that voluntary appearance is a basis for jurisdiction under
Article 4(1) C.P.C., concluded that the particular type of power of
attorney given by the defendant to his attorney was not broad enough
to be considered to create a "general agent" of the defendant in the
foreign jurisdiction."7
This decision by the Supreme Court of Cassation must be related
to previous decisions of the same court 18 which held that voluntary
acceptance was not sufficient to establish foreign jurisdiction. At least
in this case, the court did admit, as an obiter dictum, that voluntary
after the Concordat: an environment which influenced the judges more than
the writers, although some judges took a position in favor of the recognition of
foreign annulment decrees, notwithstanding the contrary view of the Supreme
Court of Cassation."
16 Article 4(1) C.P.C. provides for the jurisdiction of the Italian courts over
foreigners domiciled or resident in Italy.
1 Court of Cassation, July 21, 1962, No. 2011, Procuratore Generale v.
Santorio, 1963 Foro Italiano, I, 797.
IDecision No. 2086 of July 22, 1960, Foro Italiano, I, 1302; decision No.
2026 of September 18, 1961, 1961 Foro Italiano, I, 1618; decision No. 1596
of June 20, 1962, 1962 Foro Italiano, I, 1248.
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acceptance could create foreign jurisdiction provided the proper power
were given to the agent representing the defendant in the foreign
jurisdiction.
Another problem which arises in the recognition of a foreign
decree annulling the civil marriage of Italian citizens is the conflict with
the Italian public order by a decision in which the foreign judge does
not properly apply the Italian law. According to Article 17 of The Preliminary Dispositions of the Italian Civil Code, all matters pertaining
to the status and persons and family relationships are governed by the
law of the State to which the persons belong. Therefore, the grounds
on which a foreign judge bases his annulment must be acceptable to
Italian law (Articles 117-129 of the Civil Code). If they are acceptable by the forum where the judgment was rendered but inadmissible in Italy, the Italian judge denies recognition. Supposedly,
once the Italian judge recognizes that the grounds on which the foreign
judge based the annulment are in substance those accepted by the
Italian law, his examination should stop there. Italian courts, on the
contrary, have enlarged their examination to scrutinize the sufficiency
of the evidence submitted to the foreign judge. This invasion of the
procedural field of the foreign court finds its basis in the fear of
Italian courts that annulments of Italian marriages abroad might be
granted as a result of consensual arrangements between the parties.
Italian courts hold that the rights and duties arising from a
marriage cannot be alienated by mere consent of the parties. Therefore, Italian courts refuse to enforce judgments involving such rights
and duties in which ex parte affidavits were used as the only evidence on which the judge based his decision. In a 1959 decision, 9
the Supreme Court of Cassation reversed a lower court decision which
recognized the validity of an annulment decree rendered by a Swiss
court of a civil marriage between two Italians. Although the Swiss
court was found to have proper jurisdiction over the parties, the
Court of Cassation found the decision in conflict with Italian public
policy because the defendant had merely admitted the allegations of his
wife's complaint, and the Swiss judge, rather than reaching an independent determination, had decreed the annulment on the strength of
19 Court of Cassation, June 15, 1959, No. 1835, Procuratore Generale v.
Farando, 1959 Giustizia Civile I, 1186.
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 2

216/

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

the statements by the parties.2 ° In another 1959 decision,21 the Supreme Court of Cassation reversed the decision of the lower court and
denied recognition of a Swiss court annulment decree on the grounds
of mental incapacity. The incapacity had been proved only by a
technical report prepared by an expert named by the parties. Although the evidence had been found sufficient by the Swiss court, the
Court of Cassation found that it was in violation of Italian provisions
regulating evidence in matrimonial cases, "which, being strictly connected with the relationship which must be proved, have the character
of provisions of substantive law and, as such, are removed from the
application of the lex fori which regulates the trial."
Divorce
Canonical Marriages
For the same reasons described above, under the heading of annulments, a foreign divorce decree involving a marriage concordatario
recorded in the Italian Vital Statistics Registry, is not given exequatur
by Italian courts whether the parties to the marriage are Italian or
foreigners.The Court of Cassation, in a 1962 decision,23 refused recognition
to a divorce decree issued by a British court because the marriage had
been performed in Italy by a Catholic Priest in accordance with the
Concordat.
The court reached this conclusion brushing aside the argument
that the British court had proper jurisdiction over the marriage because
of the foreign nationality of the parties, and stated that, according to
the principles of jurisdiction prevailing in the Italian legal system
referred to in Article 797 (1) C.P.C., the only courts entitled to decide
4
on the dissolution of a canonical marriage are the ecclesiastical courts.2
20 The text of the decision is also reported in full in Miele, p. 301, with
Miele's comments thereon.
21 Court of Cassation, November 25, 1959, No. 3475, Procuratore Generale
v. Dragan, 1959 Repertorio, 1484, 113.
22 Court of Cassation, October 13, 1955, No. 3126, Moore v. Fabbroncino,
1960 Repertorio 1958, 126, Court of Cassation, December 14, 1960, No. 3248,
Bottini v. Moley, 1961 Giustizia Civile 1, 421.
23 Court of Cassation, March 20, 1962, No. 559, Roccasecca v. Titterton,
1962
Giustizia Civile, I, 843.
24
Court of Cassation, June 11, 1959, No. 1785, Hager v. Rebutti, 1959
Giustizia Civile, I, 1708.
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The number of cases which continue to reach the Supreme Court
of Cassation involving this point of law indicates that there is a contrast of opinion and that some lower courts have adopted at times a
more liberal approach by giving recognition to foreign divorce decrees.
Also among the writers there is a strong current in favor of recognition
of divorce decrees rendered by a foreign judge having jurisdiction
over non-Italian parties. The same argument regarding the limited
application of Article 34 of the Concordat, used in the case of foreign
annulment decrees of canonical marriages, is used for foreign divorce
decrees. According to the writers, the issue is not one of doubting the
tenets of the Catholic faith in the matter of the sacramentality of marriage, but simply that of determining whether these rules of canon law
have been made part of the Italian matrimonial law to the point
where they have invaded the Italian international jurisdiction, so as to
prevent the recognition of foreign divorce decrees. They conclude by
giving a negative answer to the question.2" Until now, however, the
Supreme Court of Cassation has been rather constant in its decisions
which follow an interpretation of Article 34 of the Concordat and
Article 797 ( 1 ) C.P.C. leading to an effective limitation in the recognition of foreign divorce decrees of canonical marriages even when the
parties are non-Italians.
Civil Marriages
The indissolubility of marriage, as we have noted above, is not a
principle which the Italian legal system adopted merely as a result of
the 1929 Concordat with the Holy See. It is a principle which was
sanctioned in Article 148 of the 1865 Civil Code and is repeated in
Article 149 of the 1942 Civil Code: "A marriage cannot be dissolved
except by the death of one of the spouses." Therefore, divorce is
inadmissible in Italy and a foreign divorce decree is against public
policy if both or only one of the parties involved are Italian citizens.
A basic distinction must be made, therefore, between divorces involving foreign and Italian citizens.
Divorces Involving Foreign Nationals. Before the signing by
Italy of the 1902 Hague Convention on Divorce, it was debated
whether Italian courts could give recognition to a foreign divorce
decree even if non-Italian parties were involved. The point was
25 Miele, p. 161; Fedozzi, 11 Diritto Internazionale Privato, Padova, 1939,
p. 479; Udina, Sentenze di Divorzio fra Stranieri e Matrimonio Concordatario,
1948, Foro Italiano, I, 182.
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 2
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made that divorce was against Italian public policy and recognition
was to be denied even when divorce was admitted by the national law
of the spouses and the foreign court had jurisdiction over the marriage.
By becoming member of the Hague Divorce Convention, Italy admitted that divorce was not against public policy, at least if decreed by
a court of a country member of the Convention having jurisdiction
over parties whose national law permitted divorce.
It was still debated whether Italian courts should give recognition
to divorce decrees rendered by Courts of countries not members of the
Hague Convention. The Supreme Court of Cassation gave an affirmative answer to the question in a 1939 case, ' 6 and again in three cases
decided in 1961 27 and in 1962.2' The Court of Cassation confirmed
this line of precedents in another case decided in 1963. This was an
appeal taken by the State Attorney of the Court of Appeal of Rome,
who argued that the exequatur given by the lower court to a divorce
decree rendered by a British court should have been reversed because
it was in violation of Italian public policy. As Great Britain was not
a member of the Hague Convention, the public prosecutor argued that
Italy was not obligated to give recognition to its divorce decrees and
the principle of indissolubility of marriage sanctioned in Article 149
of the Civil Code should be maintained. The Court of Cassation, in
affirming the lower court decision, noted that by ratifying the Hague
Convention, Italy agreed to recognize foreign divorce decrees of other
signatory countries and by doing so had decided to remove from the
concept of public order a divorce between non-Italians and that it
would be clearly illogical to continue to see a violation of public order
when the foreign divorce of non-Italians was rendered in a country
not member of the Hague Convention. -9
Public order, therefore, can be invoked if the divorce obtained
abroad involved parties one or both of which are Italian citizens. In
the case of an Italian woman who married a U.S. citizen and who
resided for more than a year in the U.S., an Italian court refused recogCourt of Cassation, July 13, 1939, No. 2546, 1939 Foro Italiano, I, 1097.
Court of Cassation, February 6, 1961, No. 243, Valborg v. De Mistura,
1961 Foro Italiano, I, 430.
26
27

28Court of Cassation, May 19, 1962, No. 1147, Prez v. Garih, 1962
Giustizia Civile, 1, 1196; Court of Cassation, July 10, 1962, No. 1816, Procuratore Generale v. Iseppi, 1962 Settimana Cassazione 771.
29 Court of Cassation, November 23, 1963, No. 3020, Procuratore Generale
v. Corinaldesi, 1963 Foro Italiano, I, 280.
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nition to a divorce decree obtained in the United States because the
Italian woman, who had not acquired United States nationality iure
matrimonii, had not lost Italian nationality." In a case in which an
Italian woman had automatically acquired foreign nationality iure
matrimonii, and lost her Italian nationality, the recognition was
granted."
It is clear that when the parties are both foreigners, and the marriage was either performed in Italy or abroad, public order will not be
invoked to prevent recognition of a foreign divorce decree. A problem
arises, however, where there has been change of nationality for the
specific purpose of obtaining a divorce outside of Italy in order to avoid
the effects of Italian law, since a change of nationality changes the
personal law of the party and a divorce would be granted under the
new personal law of the parties rather than under Italian law. The
attitude of Italian courts, and some of the writers towards this type of
divorce, described as "fraudulent" because it is based on a fictitious
change of nationality, has been that of opposition to the validity of
the divorce decree. This attitude is similar to that of other countries
with anti-divorce policy."' The 1963 decision of the Court of Cassation already referred to above (pp. 16, 17) made reference to the
argument of fraud raised by the public prosecutor and accepted the
finding of facts made by the lower court to the effect that, in that case,
there was no possibility of fictitious change of nationality by the
husband who had been an Italian national. The lower court had found
that the husband had obtained the foreign nationality "a long time
before the filing of the divorce action" and had constantly resided and
was still residing in the forum of the country of judgment, a residence
which was readily explained by the professional activity of the person
in question.
This possibility that Italian courts will enter into an examination
of the possible element of fraud and the possible fictitiousness of the
change of nationality by the parties involved gives an idea of the difference of the situation between the recognition of foreign divorces
30

Court of Cassation, November 23, 1963, No. 3020, Procuratore Generale

v. Corinaldesi, 1963 Foro Italiano, I, 280.
31 Court of Appeal of Firenze, May 13, 1960, Gerbi v. Frampton, 1969
Giurisprudenza Toscana, 529.
32 See Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study (2d ed. 1958)
Vol. I, Ch. 12.
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in Italy and that which has been inaugurated by the New York cases of
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel and Wood v. Wood.
In New York, courts seem to have abandoned even the possibility
of examining the nexus between person and place to determine whether
it is of such permanence as to create a domicile sufficient to give jurisdiction to the foreign court. In Italy, while domicile remains an element of the jurisdiction of the foreign court, the basic element is given
by the personal law of the parties and that is determined by nationality.
Aside from the practical consideration that nationalities are not
changed with the same ease as domicile, there is always another aspect
which couples bent on a consensual "bilateral" divorce must weigh:
the possibility that the court will examine their change of nationality
and consider it fictitious. One may be certain that the State Attorney
will not leave any leaf unturned to show, if possible, that the divorce
was obtained in fraudem legis.
Some of the Italian writers criticize the search by Italian courts
of the existence of nationality of the spouses. As long as the acquisition
of the nationality of the divorce forum is effective, as long as the
divorce is decreed by a judge who has jurisdiction in the international
sense, and the decree does not contravene public policy, there is no
reason for the Italian judge to refuse recognition. The use of the
exequatur proceeding to include an investigation of possible fraudulent
motives is an unreasonable extension of the purpose of the proceeding. 3
Mexican Divorces
The rules hereinabove discussed indicate that Mexican divorces
of the type recognized by the New York Court of Appeals in Rosensteil v. Rosensteil and Wood v. Wood, 16 N.Y. 2d 64, would not be
given recognition in Italy if either party to the divorce were an Italian
national. While New York courts accept Mexican divorces as a
valid method of avoiding the restrictions of the present New York
divorce law, Italian courts cannot be so liberal. They are required to
follow a public policy which prohibits divorce, and therefore cannot
give recognition to a divorce which is in effect an evasion of that policy,
no matter what the validity of the divorce would be in another
jurisdiction.
33Miele,

pp. 162-164; Fedozzi, p. 273 et seq.
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